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Regions as primary political communities: 
A multi-level comparative analysis of turnout in regional electionsi 
Why is voter turnout higher in some regions and lower in others? The issue of varying 
political participation has vexed political scientists and practitioners alike, and especially so in 
the last two decades amid an apparent decline in voter turnout. However, voter turnout, and 
whether declining participation poses a crisis of legitimacy for democratic institutions, has 
principally been examined in the context of national and, more recently, European parliamentary 
elections (Jackman and Miller 1995; Blais and Dobryzynska 1998; Blais 2000; Franklin 2004; 
Flickinger and Studlar 2007). By contrast, participation in regional elections, that is, those 
elections to intermediary ‘meso-level’ authorities between the municipality and the state, has 
rarely been the subject of political inquiry, despite considerable variation in regional turnout 
from one individual to another and from one region to another.  
And yet regional democracy has become increasingly important in recent years. Across 
Europe and North America, many new elected regional legislatures and governments have been 
established while existing regional institutions have seen their power and responsibility 
extended. The regional political authority index compiled by Hooghe, Marks and Schakel (2008) 
demonstrates that, between 1970 and 2005, twenty nine of forty two mainly EU and OECD 
states became more ‘regionalized’, while only two became marginally less regionalized. 
Regional institutions now make legislative, policy and spending decisions over a vast range of 
activities central to their populations. The legitimacy underpinning regional rule comes not so 
much from the central governments that have dispersed constitutional power and responsibility, 
but from the regional populations who express (or withhold) democratic consent when electing 
regional representatives at the ballot box. Given the increasing importance of the regional layer 
of democracy, it is perhaps surprising that there has been relatively little attention paid to 
political participation in regional elections, especially beyond single case studies (for the latter, 
see Hough and Jeffery 2006; Dandoy and Schakel 2013). A few studies have examined variation 
in inter-regional turnout using aggregate data (Horiuchi 2005; Percival et al. 2007; Henderson 
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and McEwen 2010), but so far as we are aware, comparative studies of variation in individual-
level turnout in regional elections across different regions and nation-states are rare, largely 
because of a lack of comparable data.ii Yet, it is not nations and regions that decide whether to 
vote, but those citizens resident within them. The risks of a methodological reliance on 
aggregate-level data to explain individual behaviour are well-rehearsed in studies of the 
ecological fallacy (Robinson 1950; Kramer 1983). The choices individual citizens make are 
shaped by the context in which they live, but the meaning and significance of that context is 
inevitably subject to varying individual interpretations.  
 This article confronts the problem of data availability directly by using a bespoke dataset 
which merges individual-level data from different survey sources, and supplements the merged 
data with aggregate data pertinent to the regional level. The resulting dataset is used to explore 
variations in individual voter participation in regional elections across twenty nine regions in 
Canada, the UK and Spain. 
The article’s objectives are threefold: first, to examine the power of existing models 
developed from national election studies to explain voter participation in regional elections; 
second, to argue that variation in regional turnout can be understood better by supplementing 
existing models with variables particular to regional politics; and third, to contrast the capacity of 
individual and aggregate level variables to explain variation in individual voter participation. In 
line with earlier research (Percival et al. 2007; Henderson and McEwen 2010; Ragsdale and 
Rusk 2011), we expect that regional voter participation is affected by the power and influence of 
the institutions being elected, as well as the sense of attachment voters feel to the region in 
question. We also hypothesise that electoral behaviour will be driven by individual perceptions 
of an institution’s importance, as well as the feelings electors have toward the region in question. 
We thus distinguish between the impact of subjective and objective indicators.  We expect that 
individual perceptions matter, but that their effect will vary and be conditional.  
 
Regions as primary political communities 
 2 
Regional Explanations for Voter Participation 
Assessing the stakes: voter turnout and the perceived importance of regional institutions 
Many studies of regional electoral behaviour draw on the assumptions of ‘second order 
elections’ theory, first advanced by Reif and Schmitt (1980; see also Reif 1985; Marsh 1998; 
Schmitt 2004; Flickinger and Studlar 2007; Clark and Rohrschneider 2009). The primary 
concern of such studies has been to account for voting behaviour, including lower and varying 
levels of participation in European parliamentary elections. In their original study, however, Reif 
and Schmitt included regional elections as well as municipal elections, by-elections and elections 
to second chambers as the categories of elections that could be categorised as ‘second-order’ 
(Reif and Schmitt 1980: 8). Second-order elections play a subordinate role to first-order national 
elections because voters have less of a stake in their outcome. Regional and municipal authorities 
have fewer powers and responsibilities than national governments and so the outcome of their 
elections might be perceived to matter less. Federalism itself can further diminish the incentive 
to vote because the division of powers between elected institutions can limit the decisiveness of 
voting in any one election (Downs 1999; Cutler 2004). In a second-order election with less at 
stake, the incentive to vote is diminished.  
Applied to the regional level, the second order thesis requires qualification. Although 
turnout is typically lower in regional elections than in national elections (Franklin 1999), this is 
not always the case. For example, provincial/Land elections conducted between 2003 and 2006 
in Canada and Germany recorded a gap of forty percentage points between regions with the 
lowest turnout and those with the highest level of participation (Henderson and McEwen 2010).iii 
Second, unlike by-elections or elections to the European Parliament, regional elections can lead 
to the election of a government. Although the political authority these governments wield varies 
within and across states, the dominant trend over the last four decades has been towards 
increased regional power. Many regional governments now have decision-making autonomy 
over a wide range of domestic policy spheres that matter a great deal to regional electorates 
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(Hooghe et al. 2008). Thus, for the voting public, regional elections can have rather a lot at 
stake. Existing studies using aggregate data suggest that regions with greater constitutional and 
fiscal power are associated with higher rates of participation in regional (Henderson and 
McEwen 2010; Percival et al, 2007) as well as state-wide (Ragsdale and Rusk 2011) elections. 
What is perceived to be at stake relies not just on the objective authority of the legislature but its 
perceived importance to citizens. Thus, the decision to vote or abstain may be influenced not just 
by the authority these institutions wield relative to other authorities, but by voter perceptions of 
institutional authority and competence.  
 
Primary political communities and voter participation 
The literature on voter turnout suggests that certain types of individuals are more likely to 
vote than others (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Crewe 1981; Blais 2000; Franklin 2004; 
Wolfinger and Wolfinger 2008). Being older, better educated, middle class, married, and church-
attending are all positively correlated with voting. Such individuals are more likely to have the 
resources (including knowledge, income and time), to incur the fewest costs while participating, 
and they are also most likely to feel most closely integrated into society (Blais 2000: 52). Their 
electoral participation may thus express a sense of belonging. Identification with a party is also a 
positive predictor of participation in national elections (Campbell et al. 1960; Gimpel and Lay 
2005; Bélanger and Eagles 2007). A more explicit measure of belonging, and in particular one 
tied to the region itself, may likewise have a mobilising effect, fostering participation in regional 
elections.  
In many sub-state regions, a distinctive regional identity is an important part of the way 
citizens define themselves. In regions where territorial identity is strong (such as Quebec, 
Scotland and Catalonia), territorial identity often supersedes other aspects of identity, and 
individuals who possess strong identities or attachments to their community tend to participate 
more in a range of political activities than those who lack such attachments (Henderson 2007). 
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This may also play a role in electoral participation. When attachment to the region is strong, the 
electoral stakes may be perceived to be higher, with voters finding greater rewards or 
‘consumption benefits’ from engaging with the political system (Riker and Ordershook 1968). 
Citizens may thus attach a subjective importance to electoral contests regardless of the political 
authority wielded by elected regional institutions. In other words, those who feel a strong sense 
of regional identity may thus regard the region as their primary political community. Under such 
a scenario, regional institutions can assume a symbolic importance, and serve as the vehicle for 
expressing regional difference and the collective voice of the community.  
Beyond individual perceptions of identity, regions generally regarded as more distinctive 
can foster political participation by generating a sense of collective ownership about regional 
electoral contests, as well as influencing the discourses and strategies of the parties competing 
for votes. In highly distinctive regions, it can become ‘our’ regional election, in which ‘our’ 
government will be elected to decide policy based on ‘our’ needs, and often to defend ‘our’ 
interests against ‘them’ (the ‘external other’ in this case most likely being the state-level 
government or other regions within the state). In such regions, even individuals with low levels 
of personal regional identity may be persuaded that regional elections are salient to the region as 
a whole.  
Whatever their distinguishing characteristics, regional populations are not homogeneous. 
Just as some demographic groups are more inclined to vote than others, so too are some groups 
more inclined towards identifying with regional level institutions. Most notably, existing 
research underlines that age is significantly related to both turnout and to regional identity, but in 
opposite directions. In general, older citizens are more likely to vote than younger citizens, while 
younger age groups are more likely to have a stronger sense of regional identity than older age 
groups, in part because of the latter’s attachment to national level institutions. This is a 
curvilinear relationship, however, and one which can relate to life cycle events as much as age 
itself (Blais 2006, Oppenhuis 1995, Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). Age can be a measure of 
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embeddedness within a community but the territorial scale of one’s primary community may 
vary between the young and the old.  
 
Hypotheses 
These distinctive features of regional-level political behaviour have led us to generate a 
set of hypotheses to enable us to examine the extent to which understanding regional political 
participation requires consideration of regional-level variables: 
Institutional salience 
1. Individuals living in regions with stronger regional legislatures will be more likely to 
vote in regional elections. 
2. Individuals who perceive their regional government to be more important will be more 
likely to vote in regional elections, regardless of the actual constitutional authority 
wielded by the regional legislature. 
Regional Identity 
3. Individuals with a stronger sense of regional identity will be more likely to vote in 
regional elections. 
4. Individuals living in regions where collective regional identity is strong will be more 
likely to vote in regional elections, irrespective of their own sense of identification with 
the region.  
Regional Distinctiveness 
5. Individuals will be more likely to vote if they are living within regions where regional 
distinctiveness is strong. 
Interaction effects 
6. The effects of individual expressions of identity on propensity to vote will be 
augmented by the relative strength of identity across the region as a whole. 
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7. The effects of individual perceptions of institutional salience on propensity to vote will 
be augmented by the relative authority wielded by regional political institutions. 
8. The effect of identity on turnout will vary across different age groups 
 
Methodology 
This article relies on a merged dataset of individual-level data drawn from election 
surveys of 14,646 individuals in twenty nine regions across three multi-level states, Spain, 
Canada and the United Kingdom.iv In each case, the region is defined as the tier of political 
authority between the municipality and the central state, with an elected authority that boasts a 
range of executive and legislative powers (the Spanish autonomous communities, Canadian 
provinces and the UK’s devolved territories). The dataset includes a broad range of individual-
level variables including socio-economic variables, voting behaviour, social and political 
attitudes and identity. It supplements these individual-level variables with a range of aggregate-
level variables collected at the regional level to reflect the socio-economic, institutional and 
political context in which regional elections take place, as well as the variation in political 
authority and cultural distinctiveness between the regions in the study. The following section 
outlines our approach to case selection, dataset selection, validity and reliability, and our 
measurement of variables. 
 
Case selection 
We have selected our three states for five reasons. First, all are established democracies holding 
free and fair elections. Second, all are multi-level parliamentary systems, where regional 
elections lead to the election of a regional government with authority over regional legislation. 
As a result we can be confident that the regional legislative elections matter more than they do 
in, for example, presidential systems where directly-elected regional leaders such as state 
governors have a considerable role (King, 1994). Third, we have selected cases where rates of 
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turnout vary both within and across states. For the period under study, the average turnout ranges 
from 43.8 in the UK to 66.7 in Spain. In both Canada and Spain we can see clear differences in 
the turnout rates of different regions. Across the seventeen Spanish autonomous communities, 
there is a gap of more than twenty percentage points between the lowest turnout rate (Balearic 
Islands) and the highest (Basque region), while in Canada more than thirty percentage points 
distinguish rates of participation in the least (Alberta) and the most voter active (PEI) of the ten 
provinces.  Fourth, the regions included in our dataset wield varying levels of regional authority. 
On the regional authority index (Hooghe, et al. 2008) for example, scores range from 11.5/24 for 
Wales to 20/24 for the Canadian provinces. Fifth, each of the states selected can be considered 
multi-national, within which some - but not all - constituent units may be distinguished by 
regional languages or a strong and distinctive sense of regional identity.  
Our case selection provides us with variation on both our dependent and independent 
variables, but our choices are also constrained by issues of data availability. In drawing our cases 
from only multi-national states, we exclude relatively homogeneous federations which might 
have uniformly low levels of regional identification or where regional dynamics might be less 
evident. Homogeneous states, even ones with long-established regional levels of government, 
typically do not field the surveys necessary to produce broadly comparable measures of 
participation in regional elections, regional identity and perceived regional autonomy. Our case 
selection therefore includes ‘usual suspect’ historic nations, such as Quebec, Scotland and 
Catalonia, but these are examined alongside regions with lower levels of regional distinctiveness. 
The internal variation in identity, and the variation across states with respect to regional 
authority, reinforces our confidence in the external validity of our findings. 
Dataset selection 
Data availability also shapes and constrains the selection of surveys used to create our 
merged dataset. The merged dataset contains respondents originally included in the 2004 
Canadian Election Survey, the 2003 Scottish Social Attitudes Survey, the 2003 Welsh Assembly 
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Election Survey and the Instituciones y Autonomias 2002 survey in Spain. Initial sample sizes 
for each country are 10476 (Spain), 2496 (UK) and 1674 (Canada).v  
We selected these surveys for two reasons. First, they contain the four types of variables 
(lacking in more recent surveys) which we require for our analysis: questions probing 
participation in regional elections; questions on territorial identity; attitudinal and behavioural 
control variables; and a range of demographic variables. Very few datasets contain each of these 
four types of variables. Second, these datasets facilitate comparative analysis of turnout in the 
elections that took place across a similar period, namely 2001-2003 in Canada, 1999-2001 in 
Spain, and 2003 in the UK.  
Creating a merged dataset out of four different data sources raises obvious issues of 
validity and reliability. Fieldwork for our datasets was conducted during different types of 
political events. The Canadian Election Survey (2004), for example, was conducted during and 
after the 2004 federal election, while the Scottish and Welsh surveys were conducted after the 
2003 devolved elections. In the first survey, therefore, the question on turnout in state-wide 
elections taps behaviour that is most proximate, whereas the question on turnout in regional 
elections will require respondents to recall behaviours that occurred at least a year earlier. This 
situation is reversed in the Scottish and Welsh surveys conducted in the wake of their respective 
regional elections, while the 2002 Instituciones y Autonomias survey was not designed as an 
election survey. These differences are noteworthy because we know that context can influence 
survey responses. Levels of political interest and partisan identification, for example, are 
heightened during election campaigns (Bartels, 1996; Holbrook, 1996; Nadeau, et al., 2008). We 
might likewise assume that regional identity would become heightened during regional elections 
but dampened during national ones. Until we have at our disposal surveys that are conducted in 
similar contexts and contain the requisite questions, a merged dataset is the only way we are able 
to conduct a comparative investigation of regional electoral turnout. We address additional issues 
of reliability in the section on robustness below. 
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Designing a multi-level model of regional turnout 
Our dependent variable is self-reported voter turnout.vi Our model distinguishes among 
independent variables derived from our hypotheses, individual-level control variables and 
contextual variables and interaction terms. The individual-level control variables appeared in the 
original four surveys, while the contextual variables have been derived from other sources. The 
independent variables and interaction terms present a mix of the two. 
 
Independent variables 
Our two individual-level independent variables are perceived regional government 
impact and individual regional identity. Each of these has been asked in slightly different ways 
across the cases. The regional government impact question is derived from our consideration of 
the stakes electors may invest in election outcomes. In Canada and Spain, respondents were 
asked to evaluate the impact of different governments on them personally, or on ‘the welfare of 
you and your family’. In the UK, respondents were asked to evaluate the impact of the devolved 
institutions have on how the region is run. This difference in question wording warrants a 
cautious interpretation of the data but, as functionally equivalent questions, they provide us with 
a method to test the distinction between subjective and objective measures of legislative 
authority.  
With respect to identity, respondents in the UK and Spain were presented with a bipolar 
identity scale, in which they had to select the identity that ‘best describes how you see yourself’ 
(UK) or ‘best identifies you’ (Spain). In Canada, respondents were asked to identify the 
geographic scale with which they most identify. These three questions have been converted to a 
three-point scale (ranging from 0-1) where respondents are coded as more attached to the region 
(1), equally attached to region and state (.5), or more attached to the state (0). This helps us to 
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determine whether turnout is higher among individuals for whom the region is their primary 
political community.  
In addition to individual feelings of identity and perceptions of the relative importance of 
regional institutions, our model considers the regional context in which elections take place. A 
strong regional government, a regional community where regional identity is strong, with a 
distinctive language and regionally distinctive political parties might create a more compelling 
environment in which to vote in regional elections. To test this, we have created five aggregate 
variables designed to capture regional strength and distinctiveness. We believe these are critical 
to understanding how and whether regions may serve as important political communities for 
citizens. 
Regional institutional authority: We employ objective measures of regional institutional 
authority to assess the extent to which voter participation will vary depending on the importance 
of regional governing institutions. We rely on Hooghe et al.’s (2008) regional authority index. 
The first indicator, self-rule, measures political and fiscal autonomy including policy scope, 
institutional depth, the operation of representative institutions, and taxing power, with possible 
scores ranging from zero to fifteen. Canadian provinces score fifteen. UK Scores range from 
eight to thirteen and Spanish scores range from thirteen to fourteen.vii The second indicator, 
shared rule, measures regional influence in state political institutions, including: veto power over 
constitutional change; regional representation in law making; the presence of executive 
federalism; and regional influence over the distribution of tax revenues, with possible scores 
ranging from zero to nine. Canadian provinces score five, UK devolved regions score 3.5 and 
Spanish regions vary between 1.5 and two. This is a more restricted range that we would find in 
a larger sample of states but deviation within states on both measures provides further variation. 
In addition, we have devised four measures of regional distinctiveness.    
Collective regional identity: This variable captures the extent to which our regions are 
strong identity regions. It is an aggregate variable calculated from the International Social 
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Survey Programme 2003 survey on national identity, which asks respondents to indicate how 
attached they feel (on a four point scale) to their region and the state. We recoded the variable so 
that it varies between -1 and +1 (with positive numbers implying greater aggregate regional 
attachment relative to the state) and assigned to each respondent in our dataset the mean score 
for his or her region of residence. By including both individual-level regional identity and 
aggregate regional identity scores in our model, we are able to distinguish between the extent to 
which individual political participation is influenced by living in a strong identity region or by 
personally feeling a strong sense of identification with the region. The ISSP data provide a 
measure of aggregate regional identity which is both separate from the responses provided in the 
datasets we merged and has been collected outside regional or state election campaigns.  
Regional language: A distinctive regional language is often a mark of cultural 
distinctiveness which may indirectly shape regional attachment or heighten one’s focus on 
regional institutions. We have used a binary measure of regional language, coded as 1 if more 
than 20% speak a language that is not the majority language of the state.  
Regional parties: The presence or absence of regional parties might also help to mobilise 
regional participation. Here we treat as ‘regional’ both regionalised parties - those that contest 
seats only in the region (Brancati 2008), and regionalist parties - those that seek greater 
autonomy or self-determination for the region (De Winter 1998). Regional parties often 
participate in state-wide elections as well as regional elections, but for those electors who 
sympathise with them, the incentive to vote for them - and to participate in the election - may be 
greater in the regional political arena, where they usually have a greater chance of leading the 
government.viii As above, we use an interval measure that reflects the proportion of support for 
regional parties in the relevant regional election.  
As our hypotheses make clear, we expect our individual-level and region-specific 
measures of regional distinctiveness, including regional authority and regional identity, to be 
positively correlated with turnout. The more a region can be characterised as powerful and 
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distinctive, and the more individuals perceive it to be such, the more they may be inclined to 
participate in regional electoral contests. 
 
Control variables  
Our individual-level control variables include age, gender, employment status and 
educational attainment, as well as political interest and ideology. These are the six variables 
asked in similar ways across the four datasets and we have recoded the data to ensure 
convergence in measurement scales.ix Among the control variables we expect age, educational 
attainment, employment status, political interest and right wing ideology to have a positive 
impact on turnout, consistent with findings in the literature on voter turnout at the state level 
(Campbell, et al., 1960, Blais, 2000, Franklin, 2004).  
We have also added demographic and contextual variables which the literature suggests 
have an impact on voter turnout at the national level (Blais and Dobrzynska, 1998; Geys, 2006). 
The demographic variables include regional population, population density and regional gross 
domestic product (GDP). Each of these figures is available from the OECD regional statistics 
database. We have used data for 2000 as this is at the beginning of the time period when regional 
elections in our dataset took place. GDP is reported in US dollars per capita, adjusted for 
purchasing power parity. Density is reported as the number of individuals per km2. The results 
for regions vary considerably. Density, for example, ranges from 1.43 in Newfoundland to well 
over 600 in Madrid. In each case we have therefore logged the original variable. The contextual 
variables include whether the election produced a one party majority, electoral closeness - 
measured as the percentage point difference between the shares of votes earned by the two 
largest parties across the region as a whole - the number of parties winning seats in the election 
and the Gallagher disproportionality index, based on the gap between seats and votes for the two 
largest parties. 
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xThe literature on state level turnout argues fairly consistently that greater density, higher 
GDP (Blais and Dobrzynska, 1998), and electoral closeness are positively associated with 
turnout (Berch, 1993; Jackman, 1987; Jackman and Miller, 1995; Franklin, 2004), including at 
the regional scale (Tucker 1986; Caldeira and Patterson, 1982), while disproportionality (Singh 
2011) and a larger population (Blais, 2006) are negatively associated with turnout.xi We expect 
the same to be true in our dataset. There is less agreement on the effect of the number of parties 
and one party majority government (Blais, 2006). Fundamentally the disagreement is over 
whether a clear choice or greater choice is more appealing to prospective voters (see for 
example Jackman and Miller 1995; Blais, 2006). To date, most research has shown a negative 
relationship between the number of parties and voter turnout and we see no reason why this 
should not be true at the regional level. Furthermore, if electoral decisiveness matters (Downs 
1957), elections that produce single party majority governments should have higher levels of 
turnout (Jackman 1987) but this has not been borne out by analyses of turnout (Blais and Carty 
1990; Blais and Dobryzynska 1998; Blais 2006). We believe that in regional legislatures, 
however, single party majority governments will matter because they will enhance the perceived 
importance of the regional legislature, magnifying what is perceived to be at stake. 
We have excluded institutional variables such as weekend voting, compulsory voting, 
concurrent elections and type of electoral system from our model because of the low levels of 
variation across the regions in our dataset. None, for example, employs compulsory voting, only 
one region (Andalusia) held a regional election simultaneously with a state election, and the 
absence of weekend voting in Canada and the UK would make it a proxy for Spain. 
  Our model allows us to make three contributions to the literature on turnout. First, we can 
determine whether indicators typically used to account for turnout at the state level are similarly 
influential when we examine participation in regional electoral contests, or whether the 
hypothesised effects of regional authority and regional identity help to explain variations in 
regional turnout. Second, we can distinguish between the individual-level and region-specific 
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determinants of political participation, and determine whether subjective or objective indicators 
of regional political authority and regional identity are most compelling in getting voters to the 
polls. Third, these empirical contributions allow us to make a conceptual contribution to the 
literature on turnout, distinguishing between predictors relevant at different electoral levels and 
clarifying the impact of regional distinctiveness on turnout. 
 
Results 
We estimated our multi-level models by employing binary logistic regression using 
MLwiN. The inclusion of both individual-level and region-specific predictors raises particular 
modelling concerns, not least the different amounts of variance between the two levels. Fitting 
such a hierarchical model using ordinary logistic regression, for example, runs the risk of 
encouraging type I errors in the evaluation of our aggregate predictors by underestimating 
standard errors. To address these potential pitfalls, we relied on multi-level modelling techniques 
(Snijders and Bosker 1999). We estimated five models using iterative generalised least squares 
(IGLS).xii Model one includes the standard individual-level variables used to predict probability 
of voting. We then add our individual-level independent variables in model two. This includes 
perceived impact of regional institutions and two variables that probe medium and high levels of 
subjective territorial identity. Medium identity includes respondents who professed equal 
attachment to region and state; high identity respondents prioritised their regional identity over 
their state identity. The third model includes our objective measures of regional authority and our 
aggregate measure of regional identity.xiii The contextual control variables are added in Model 
four. In our fifth model, we include interaction terms that allow us to test directly the relationship 
between our individual-level ‘subjective’ and our aggregate-level ‘objective’ determinants of 
voting. These are cross-level interaction terms between individual and aggregate identity, and 
between perceived and actual regional autonomy. We have used self rule as the aggregate 
counterpart to salience as we believe this to be closest to what the individual measure taps. In 
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addition, because our identity variable is ordinal, we have created separate interaction terms for 
medium and high identity. The results of these five models are set out in Table one. 
Table 1 about here. 
Assessing the hypotheses 
Why do some individuals vote in regional elections and others do not? The individual-
level variables used in the existing literature to explain variation perform well in our models. 
Older respondents, those with university degrees, employed respondents and those with higher 
levels of political interest are more likely to vote, suggesting that the same sorts of individuals 
participate in regional elections as participate in state-level elections. Age in particular has a 
large effect. Only left-right ideology is unrelated to regional turnout.  
The addition of our independent individual-level variables in Model two highlights the 
impact of identity. Respondents who are equally attached to region and state and those who 
prioritise their regional identity are more likely to vote in regional elections than those who 
prioritise their state identity (the base category). . The perceived salience of regional institutions, 
however, is in Model two insignificant at the individual level. 
Subsequent models introduced aggregate level variables to test the effectiveness of 
regional authority and regional distinctiveness. Both ‘self rule’ (regional political autonomy) and 
‘shared rule’ (regional influence in central institutions) matter. An increase in self rule is 
correlated with a higher propensity to vote. Shared rule, by contrast, has a negative coefficient, 
depressing turnout at the regional level. These effects survive across all subsequent models. The 
distinctiveness of a region, however, appears less important. Neither aggregate identity, nor 
regional language is significant and the presence of regional parties is negatively correlated with 
turnout. The results change slightly once we add the aggregate-level control variables. 
Individuals living in regions with distinct regional languages are more likely to vote, an effect 
which survives later modifications in subsequent models. Regional parties cease to be 
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significant. Self and shared rule remain significant while aggregate identity is consistently 
insignificant.  
Model four, which added the variables typically used to account for turnout in national 
elections, offered little further explanatory power. Only density and the number of parties are 
significantly related to turnout.xiv The model seems to suggest that the context in which election 
takes place, including the degree of disproportionality of results, the presence of majority 
governments and the gap between the two largest parties, are largely irrelevant to the decision to 
vote in regional elections. Our findings highlight a key deviation from turnout research 
conducted at the level of the nation-state: the demographic factors relevant to state turnout 
appear equally relevant to regional elections; the electoral context variables, less so. 
These results can allow us to draw preliminary conclusions regarding the hypothesised 
relationship between regional identity, regional influence and voter turnout. Our first hypothesis 
suggested that voter turnout would be higher in regions where the regional institutions had 
higher levels of autonomy and influence, while our second hypothesis suggested that voters’ 
perceptions of institutional salience may matter more than these objective measures in the 
decision to turn out to vote. These preliminary findings partially confirm the first hypothesis but 
not the second. Self and shared rule are significant across the models, but with different effects 
for each measure. Whereas individuals living in regions with strong levels of institutional 
autonomy are more likely to vote, as predicted, strong levels of regional influence are associated 
with lower turnout. This suggests that the incentive to participate is higher for regions with 
greater decision-making capacity, while having greater influence within central institutions 
appears to diminish the perceived importance of voting in regional elections. The perceived 
salience of regional institutions was consistently an insignificant predictor of regional turnout, 
and thus our second hypothesis - that individuals who believe their regional legislature to be 
more important are more likely to vote in regional elections – cannot be confirmed initially.  
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Our third hypothesis, that individuals who express a stronger sense of regional identity 
will be more likely to vote in regional elections, is confirmed and remains significant at least at 
the 0.10 level even after aggregate variables are added. Moreover, the distinction we draw 
between high and medium identity creates the anticipated effect – the stronger the regional 
identity, the higher the likelihood to vote in regional elections. Hypothesis four suggested that 
living in a strong identity region may influence the decision to turnout regardless of one’s own 
individual identity, but there is little support for this hypothesis in the data. Aggregate regional 
identity appears insignificant when considered in isolation, while the effects of other 
characteristics of regional distinctiveness, a distinctive regional language and regional parties, 
are inconsistent. We therefore fail to confirm hypothesis five. Thus, with respect to regional 
institutional authority, objective indicators seem to matter more, while for identity, individual 
rather than aggregate measures matter.    
Cross-level Interactions 
Our final models allow us to probe further the interactions between these subjective and 
objective indicators. Model five includes cross-level interaction terms examining the relationship 
between individual-level variables concerning identity and perceived salience, and aggregate-
level objective or context variables such as self rule and aggregate regional identity.  
Figures 1a and 1b about here 
Our results demonstrate that neither interaction term is significant, so we fail to confirm 
hypotheses six and seven. These results surprised us. To investigate further the relationship 
between our cross-level terms we created graphs that summarise the interaction in figures 1a and 
1b. The results show that those with a lower perceived salience of government institutions are 
less likely to vote than those who perceive their political institutions to be important, and this 
relationship holds across the range of actual power wielded by legislatures. These results show 
also that as self rule increases, so too does the probability of voting. The results are less intuitive 
when we examine our cross-level interaction term for identity. Figure 1b demonstrates that 
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medium identifiers – those who are equally attached to the region and the state – are unaffected 
by those around them. They are as likely to vote in lower identity regions as they are in high 
identity regions. Low regional identifiers (those more attached to the state) are less likely to vote 
than high identifiers (those more attached to the region) and this relationship holds across the 
range of aggregate regional attachment. We see, however, a negative relationship between 
aggregate regional identity and turnout. Low and high identifiers living in regions with a strong 
sense of regional attachment are less likely to vote than those living in regions with a weaker 
sense of regional attachment. This again, seemed a counterintuitive finding.  
Figure 2 about here. 
 
An explanation may be found if we return to the findings of model 1, which indicated the 
strength of the relationship between age and turnout. Age is significantly related to both turnout 
and to regional identity, but in opposite directions. Older citizens are more likely to vote than 
younger citizens, while younger age groups are more likely to have a stronger sense of regional 
identity than older age groups, in part because of the latter’s attachment to state-wide institutions 
(Blais 2006, Oppenhuis 1995, Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). We see such trends in our 
dataset.  Regions with a younger median age, on average, are also more likely to have a stronger 
sense of aggregate regional attachment (r=-.75). To capture the various relationships between 
age, individual-level identity and aggregate identity we have created cross-level interaction terms 
and included these in Model six. The results show that the interaction terms of age and aggregate 
identity and for medium identity and aggregate identity are significant, but the others are not. To 
understand better the relationship among age, individual identity and aggregate identity we have 
created a five panel graph in figure 2.  
In figure 2 the y axis is the probability of voting, the x axis is aggregate regional 
attachment, and the individual lines represent the three identity groups (low, medium and high). 
The five panels in our figure examine the relationship between individual-level identity and 
aggregate identity for five age cohorts: the youngest ten percent in the dataset, the youngest 
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twenty five percent, the middle fifty percent, the oldest twenty five percent and oldest ten 
percent. Figure two demonstrates how the relationship between subjective and aggregate identity 
changes across age cohorts. For the youngest ten percent in our dataset, aggregate identity has a 
negative relationship with turnout, depressing the probability of voting across all identity groups. 
The effect is most marked for the low identifiers but it is present too for the medium and high 
identifiers. This relationship is less marked when we add in older respondents and by the time we 
turn to the oldest cohorts in our dataset, we see a different relationship entirely. Here, as 
aggregate identity increases, so too does the probability of voting. The effect is most marked for 
low identifiers, who see the largest increase in the probability of voting as we move from a 
region with lower levels of regional distinctiveness (as measured by aggregate identity levels)  to 
one with higher degrees of regional feeling. The non-significant findings reported in table 1 
capture the relationship for the middle panel in our figure, which is why the interaction effect 
does not appear to add anything to our interpretation. The results as demonstrated here, however, 
not only clarify the nature of the interaction between individual and aggregate level identity, but 
make clear that the nature of the interaction is conditional on age, a finding that would have been 
impossible to detect by analysing aggregate level findings alone.  
Model Performance 
Binary logistic multi-level models do not employ measures of pseudo R2 in the way that 
single-level models might. Instead, we rely on the proportion of unexplained variance across the 
regions in our dataset to analyse the performance of our model as a whole. We can see that this 
decreases from .32 in Model one to .02 in the three final models. We provide two additional 
measures of model fit, the variance partition coefficient (VPC) (Snijders and Bosker 1999) and 
median odds ratio (MOR) (Larsen and Merlo 2005, Merlo et al 2006). The MOR is more useful 
for analysing the performance of models with discrete dependent variables and can be interpreted 
as an odds ratio. If the MOR is 1.0, there are no differences across regions in the probability of 
voting. Increases in the MOR therefore reflect the variations in the probability of voting across 
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regions. As the results in table one show, we see an improvement in model performance from 
Model one to Model four. We can conclude, therefore, that the full main-effects model in Model 
four does a better job of accounting for regional-level variation in turnout and that the biggest 
improvement in model fit is due to the introduction of the aggregate-level independent variables. 
The addition of our interaction terms in Models five and six does not change the various fit 
statistics, but the additional terms do help us to understand the relationship among our existing 
independent and control variables. 
In order to determine whether our findings are beholden to particular outliers in the 
dataset we re-ran the analysis seven times, each time removing respondents from regions that 
were outliers on one or more key variables. These analyses were designed in particular to test the 
robustness of our key variables and do not show significant variation.xv 
 
Conclusion  
Regional governments in multi-level states play a key role in determining public policy, 
delivering public services, spending and sometimes raising substantial revenues, and 
representing the views of those who elect them. Voter turnout in contests which lead to the 
election of these governments can contribute to the extent to which they are invested with a 
legitimacy to govern. Understanding why some people vote and others do not is thus an 
important topic of enquiry, yet there has been little comparative analysis to shed light on why 
some people in some regions are more or less inclined to participate in regional elections. 
Moreover, the tools to facilitate such comparative analysis are sorely lacking. 
The contrastingly rich array of data sources and analyses of voter participation in national 
and supranational elections gives some insight into why some people vote and others do not. Our 
findings suggest that that these insights are only partially applicable to the regional level. As in 
contests at other electoral levels, older, more educated and employed citizens in our dataset are 
more likely to participate in regional elections than the young, the less educated or the 
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unemployed. Contextual factors that we know to influence voter turnout in state elections, 
however, seem less important. In the twenty nine regional elections we studied, the closeness of 
electoral competition, the election of single party majority governments and the 
disproportionality of electoral results do not explain voter turnout. These findings reinforce our 
view that to properly understand regional electoral behaviour, regional variables need to be taken 
into account. In particular, identifying with a region is associated with higher turnout in regional 
elections, and the perceived salience of regional institutions is also a significant predictor of 
regional turnout, once we control for the contextual factors in which an election takes place. 
Region-specific measures also affect an individual’s decision to participate. Turnout levels are 
higher where levels of regional ‘self rule’ are higher, while increases in shared rule – the extent 
to which a region is integrated within decision-making processes and institutions of central 
government – are associated with lower levels of participation in regional contests. In short, 
individuals who feel a greater sense of attachment to the region, and those who live in regions 
with greater levels of jurisdictional autonomy, are more likely to cast a ballot in regional 
elections. 
 As our final objective we evaluated the relevant impact of subjective and objective 
explanations of voter participation. In our analysis, individual identity clearly matters more than 
the aggregate measures of stronger or weaker identity regions. By contrast, the perceived 
salience of regional institutions is less influential in shaping voter participation rates than the 
actual power wielded by legislatures. Moreover, the cross-level interaction terms highlight the 
importance of objective, rather than subjective, measures of institutional authority: increases in 
self rule have a uniform effect on turnout across respondents, regardless of their perceptions of 
the relative strength of their regional legislature. When we turn to identity, however, the results 
are more complicated. Only once we examine the relationship between individual and aggregate 
identity across the different age groups in our dataset can we understand the role of regional 
identity as a predictor of turnout in regional elections.  For younger voters, increases in regional 
Regions as primary political communities 
 22 
attachment are negatively associated with turnout, while for the oldest respondents in our dataset, 
the opposite is true. We can distinguish therefore, less between the impact of subjective versus 
objective variables, than the conditions under which some subjective evaluations and objective 
markers of regions as political communities propel people to the polls. 
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Footnotes
                                                     
i   Research upon which this article is based was funded through a grant provided by Social Sciences and 
Humanities Research Council of Canada.  The authors gratefully acknowledge research assistance 
provided by Helen Graham and would like to thank the anonymous reviewers and Kelvyn Jones for 
helpful comments and suggestions.  
ii The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), for example, promotes comparative research on 
individual participation and voting behaviour in national elections by ensuring that a common module of 
survey questions is included in the post-election studies of participating election study teams from across 
the democratic world (http://www.umich.edu/~cses/). No such tool with comparable coverage exists at 
the regional level, although the Citizenship After the Nation State dataset (Henderson et al 2013), and 
Making Electoral Democracy Work (www.electoraldemocracy.com) project provide partial coverage.  
iii Turnout in sub-state elections typically exceeds state-level turnout in Newfoundland, Quebec, Northern 
Ireland and the Åland islands and a similar effect has been identified in municipal elections in Japan, 
Switzerland and southern Italy (Horiuchi 2005). 
iv The Canadian survey excludes respondents in the three territories. The Spanish survey contains fewer 
than 15 respondents each in Ceuta and Melilla and so are excluded. We also exclude the Northern Ireland 
Assembly, which was suspended between 2002 and 2007. Our dataset thus includes ten provinces, 17 
autonomous communities and the two devolved regions of Scotland and Wales. 
v We removed those who did not complete the post-election wave of the CES survey. The initial single-
level analysis re-weights by regional population using 2004 data from Statistics Canada, ‘mid-2003’ data 
from the Office of National Statistics (for Scotland and Wales) and January 1, 2002 data from the 
Instituto Nacional de Estadística in Spain. As explained below, we did not use weighted data in our 
multivariate analysis. 
vi Our dependent variable was measured as follows. Canada: Did you happen to vote in the last Provincial 
election in [fill PROVINCE] in [fill in date]? UK: Talking to people about the election to the Scottish 
parliament/Welsh Assembly on the 1st of May, we have found that a lot of people didn't manage to vote. 
How about you - did you manage to vote in the election? Spain: Me podría decir a qué partido o coalición 
votó Ud. en las elecciones autonómicas de marzo de 2000 (did not vote was an option). Such measures 
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are commonly associated with a problem of over-reporting. Individuals responding to social surveys are 
more likely to admit to performing socially desirable behaviours, and their report of whether or not they 
participated in a regional election can be affected by the interview setting, the mode of survey delivery 
and the general context in which questions are asked. As Karp and Banducci note (2008), imperfect recall 
is usually associated with non-voters, who falsely claim that they cast a ballot in a previous election. In 
our dataset, the gap between official turnout and self-reported turnout varies, from a greater than 30 
percentage point gap in the Canadian province Alberta to a 3.4 percentage point gap in La Rioja. In 
general, Spanish regions reported greater consistency between official turnout figures and self-reported 
participation than the Canadian provinces. Turnout figures for respondents in the Basque region, 
however, suggest a problem of under-reporting (see footnote xv). 
vii These ranges would also take in sub-state regions in Australia, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Switzerland 
and the United States. 
viii In Spain, regional parties might also hold swing votes for national governments, offering separate 
incentives for supporting them in state-wide elections. 
ix Ideally we would also have included a variable to measure party identification, given its association 
with voter turnout. Unfortunately, the Spanish question on partisan identification asks only about the 
three largest state-wide parties and excludes identification with non state-wide parties, many of whom are 
important players in Spanish regional elections. 
x ( )∑
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Where V is the percentage of votes and S is the number of seats won by the two largest parties. 
xi We have excluded institutional variables such as weekend voting, compulsory voting, concurrent 
elections and type of electoral system from our model because of the low levels of variation across the 
regions in our dataset. None, for example, employs compulsory voting, only one region (Andalusia) held 
a regional election simultaneously with a state election, and the absence of weekend voting in Canada and 
the UK would make it a proxy for Spain. 
xii We later estimated the model using MCMC. This gives greater precision for the estimates but we opted 
to include the coefficients and standard errors for IGLS rather than the coefficients, error terms and 
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credible intervals for MCMC for reasons of space. Full results from the MCMC results, including the 
credible intervals for coefficients and DIC, are available from the authors. 
xiii We tested correlations across our variables. Among our independent variables most correlations are 
smaller than .3 but four are greater than .5 (salience and shared rule .6; self and shared rule .6, presence of 
regional parties and regional language .6 and aggregate attachment and shared rule .8). 
xiv The GDP results are likely a function of the regions in our dataset. As Blais explains, the effect 
of GDP on turnout rates emerges mainly when we compare very poor countries to all others 
(2006; see also Blais and Dobrzynska 1998). Although we have variation in regional GDP in the 
dataset, within the broader comparative literature the range is rather limited 
xv Karp and Banducci addressed the over-reporting of turnout problem by re-weighting their data to 
account for the under-representation of non-voters. The debate concerning whether and how to weight 
data in multi-level modelling has proponents on both sides  but it is common practice not to weight, and 
particularly not to include composite weights that seek to re-weight the data at the aggregate (regional) 
level and the individual level (Carle 2009). We have addressed this in two ways. We have created 
separate weights for regions to correct for the large sample size in Spain, and weights for individuals, to 
correct for the over-representation of voters and under-representation of voters. A third, composite, 
weight was created iteratively and used in a single level binary logistic regression. The results of this 
show that the coefficients for individual-level variables and aggregate independent variables do not 
change, but some of the aggregate contextual controls become significant. When we run this with 
unweighted data we find similar results. Any difference in results across the models may therefore be 
attributed to the single level model rather than to the weighting procedures. For our multi-level model, we 
adopted a different practice. We identified the mean gap between reported and official turnout figures as 
well as the standard deviation. Two regions, the Basque region and Alberta, can be considered statistical 
outliers – the Basque region because of high turnout, Alberta because of low turnout - and so we re-ran 
the analysis without respondents from these regions. Crucially, the coefficients for our variables do not 
change when we eliminate these respondents. We conducted similar calculations for our key independent 
variables: individual-level regional identity, perceived regional impact, regional autonomy and aggregate 
regional identity. This produces five additional outlier regions: Scotland (high individual-level identity) 
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Quebec (high perceived impact), Wales (low self rule), Ontario (low aggregate identity) and Cantabria 
(high aggregate identity). We re-ran our analysis four times, excluding respondents from our sets of 
outlier regions (excluding both Ontario and Cantabria in the same analysis). Once again, the coefficients 
for our variables do not show a marked change when we conduct these separate analyses.  Full details of 
all of these alternative models are available from the authors.  
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Table 1: A multi-level model of turnout in regional elections 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Fixed part       
Constant -0.642 (.15) ** -0.814 (.17)** -4.892 (1.27)** -0.227 (3.42) 0.315 (3.436) 4.552 (3.63) 
Individual variables       
Age 4.118 (.15)** 4.162 (.15)** 4.431 (.16)** 4.517 (.16)** 4.515 (.16)** -8.626 (3.74)* 
Gender 0.131 (.05)* 0.136 (.06)* 0.139 (.06)* 0.140 (.06)* 0.14 (.06)* 0.123 (.06)* 
Education  0.265 (.08)** 0.283 (.09)** 0.318 (.09)** 0.336 (.09)** 0.336 (.09)** 0.354 (.09)** 
Employment 0.486 (.06)** 0.504 (.06)** 0.507 (.06)** 0.521 (.06)** 0.523 (.06)** 0.473 (.06)** 
Political interest 0.574 (.09)** 0.557 (.09)** 0.645 (.09)** 0.660 (.09)** 0.663 (.09)** 0.689 (.09)** 
Ideology 0.219 (.13) 0.219 (.14) 0.201 (.14) 0.199 (.14) 0.192 (.14) 0.17 (.14) 
Medium identity  0.198 (.08)** 0.179 (.08)* 0.186 (.08)* -0.685 (1.09) -3.873 (1.88)* 
High identity  0.200 (.09)* 0.213 (.09)* 0.220 (.09)* 0.655 (.98) -1.334 (1.70) 
Salience  0.129 (.09) 0.171 (.09) 0.176 (.09)* 0.057 (.50) 0.145 (.49) 
Aggregate variables       
Self rule   0.327 (.06)** 0.270 (.05)** 0.276 (.06)** -5.907 (2.12)** 
Shared rule   -0.243 (.08)** -0.354 (.10)** -0.373 (.10)** 0.266 (.06)** 
Aggregate attachment   0.380 (.1.56) -0.437 (1.30) -0.862 (1.54) -0.359 (.10)** 
Regional language   0.248 (.15) 0.25 (.12)* 0.249 (.12)* 0.235 (.12)* 
Regional parties   -0.008 (.01)** -0.001 (.00) -0.001 (.00) -0.001 (.00) 
Population    0.222 (.13) 0.215 (.13) 0.224 (.13) 
Density    -0.355 (.15)* -0.347 (.15)* -0.338 (.15)* 
GDP    -0.804 (.78) -0.863 (.77) -0.922 (.77) 
Closeness    0.000 (.01) 0.000 (.01) 0.000 (.01) 
One party gov’t    0.145 (.17) 0.153 (.16) 0.145 (.17) 
Number of parties    -0.14 (.05)** -0.136 (.05)** -0.14 (.05)** 
Disproportionality    -0.007 (.01) -0.007 (.01) -0.007 (.01) 
Interaction terms       
Salience x self rule     0.01 (.04) 0.002 (.04) 
Med identity x agg     1.084 (1.37) 4.969 (2.37)* 
High identity x agg     -0.581 (1.28) 2.265 (2.19) 
Age x med identity      9.123 (5.17) 
Age x high identity      7.895 (4.51) 
Age x agg identity      17.215 (4.90)** 
Age x medid x agg      -10.934 (6.63) 
Age x highid x agg      -11.219 (5.97) 
       
Random part        
Cons (SE) .324 (.09) .363 (.10) .079 (.03) .024 (.01) .022 (.01) .023 (.01) 
VPC .090 .099 .023 .007 .006 .007 
MOR 1.68 1.732 1.292 1.152 1.145 1.148 
       
Regions 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Individuals 10389 9711 9353 9353 9353 9353 
Coefficients are unstandardized logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses..   *=p<.05, ** 
=p<.01  Full details of odds ratios for each model are available from the authors.
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Figure 1: Predicted probability of voting, by cross-level interaction terms 
 
 
1a: Perceived salience and self rule 
 
  
 
1b: Individual and aggregate identity 
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Figure 2: Predicted probability of voting, by age, individual identity and 
aggregate identity 
 
 
 
 
